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Abstract 
Espionage perpetrated by insiders using information technology (IT) assets continues to vex 
organizations.  Despite significant investment in new approaches for detection, mitigation, and 
prevention, the attacks continue.  We contend this is largely due to a low-level, signature based approach, 
despite the fact that insider cases vary across perpetrators, organizations, and over time with rapidly 
changing technology.  This paper reviews existing literature and six insider espionage cases to identify 
technical indicators of espionage.  We then propose an espionage ritual model, derived by abstracting 
technical indicators to a higher-level cycle of technical objectives.  This abstraction then allows for a more 
generalizable model, from which more robust technical detection mechanisms can be derived.  The model 
suggests that the ritual is different for other insider threats, including sabotage, fraud and IP theft and 
lays the groundwork for an empirical study.  This model has significant implications for supporting 
current research, as well as practitioners in the field challenged with insider threat detection.   
Keywords:  
Insider threat, espionage, detection, ritual 
Introduction 
Despite recent convictions (e.g., Pfc Bradley Manning, U.S. Army, and Robert Hanssen, U.S. FBI) (Band, 
et al. 2006; Dishneau 2014), strong legislation, and increased research, insider espionage perpetrated by 
insiders remains a grave concern .  National security and economic consequences from an insider threat 
can be significant, ranging from an enormous price tag, to the actual demise of organizations (Posey et al. 
2011).  While all attacks on an organization’s information security are problematic and can have profound 
consequences, insider threats are often much more challenging to detect and difficult to mitigate than 
external attacks, because insiders are trusted individuals who know the organizations and networks well 
(Nance and Marty 2011; Spitzner 2003). 
In order to detect insider espionage as early as possible, the psychological, organizational, and technical 
aspects of the problem must be understood, as well as how the actions are coordinated over time (Band, et 
al. 2006).  Researchers have analyzed past espionage cases for descriptive statistics and profiling 
purposes.  For example, Herbig and Wiskoff (2002) found that most American spies have historically 
been white males under the age of 30; nearly half (46%) have had a high school education or less; and 
one-quarter (25%) were government contractors.  The problem with such profiling, however, is it casts a 
very wide net.  If used as an indication and warning mechanism, the false positive rate is inordinate.  
Profile-based detection mechanisms are ineffective without being coupled with other detection 
approaches.  For example, Edward Snowden fits Herbig and Wiskoff’s (2002) profile perfectly, yet he was 
still able to exfiltrate classified data undetected until intentional public disclosure of the compromised 
material  (Mosk et al. 2013). 
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To better understand and study insiders, the Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute 
CERT Division began conducting insider threat research in 2001 and developed an Insider Threat Center 
among other centers (Carnegie Mellon University 2014).  For this study, the Insider Threat Center will be 
referred to as “CERT” as it is sometimes abbreviated to in insider threat research (Hanley et al. 2011). 
CERT developed a more granular taxonomy of insiders, differentiating insiders by motivation and 
method.  Specifically, CERT separated insiders into four categories: espionage, intellectual property (IP) 
theft, fraud, and information technology (IT) sabotage (Band, et al. 2006; Hanley et al. 2011).  Espionage 
refers to the willful compromise of classified or proprietary information to foreign entities (Kramer et al. 
2005).  IP theft refers to cases where malicious insiders purposely abuse their credentials to steal 
confidential or proprietary information from the organization (Moore et al. 2011).  Fraud is defined by an 
insider’s malicious use of an organizational information technology system that leads to an identity crime 
as a result of their misuse of data for personal gain or theft (Cummings et al. 2012). Last, IT sabotage 
refers to individuals who inflict damage on some area of an organization targeting IT assets (Band, et al. 
2006).  While the four categories are related and overlap to some extent, important distinctions exist 
concerning their motivations, methods, and targets, as shown in Table 1.  Accordingly, each category of 
insider should be studied and analyzed both individually and collectively, leading to the development of 
security controls specific to each type of insider.  
Insider Threat 
Category 
Motivation Method Target 
Espionage Personal crisis, 
patriotic disposition, 
civil disobedience 
Information 
exploration and 
browsing; acquisitions, 
preparation, transfer to 
an external entity 
Classified, sensitive, 
and proprietary 
information 
IP Theft Business advantage, 
financial gain, new job 
with competitor, 
disgruntlement (sense 
of entitlement 
motivates insider) 
Exfiltration of data via 
email, removable 
media, remote network 
access 
Source code, business 
plans, customer 
information, trade 
secrets, internal 
organizational 
information, 
proprietary software 
Fraud Financial gain or 
financial difficulty 
Typically not 
technically 
sophisticated; usually 
committed during work 
hours 
Personally Identifiable 
Information 
Sabotage Personal grudge / 
revenge 
More technically 
sophisticated means 
including use of remote 
access, logic bombs, 
back doors, other 
malware 
Employer’s system or 
network 
Table 1.  Insider Threat Taxonomy 
Adapted from (Band, et al. 2006; Cummings et al. 2012; Herbig and Wiskoff 2002; Kramer and Heuer 2007; 
Moore et al. 2013; Roy Sarkar 2010)  
Because of the vast differences in motivations, methods, and targets between CERT’s four insider threat 
categories, technical indicators of insider activity vary.  Regarding theft of IP, Moore et al. (2013) found 
that 70% of insiders stole IP data within 60 days of their departure, and 50% of them stole at least some of 
the information within 30 days of their departure.  As a result, security information and event 
management (SIEM) system signatures commonly define a 30-60 day departure window aperture.  In 
contrast, espionage cases tend to exhibit much longer-term data collection and exfiltration cycles.  In fact, 
analyses of existing cases suggest it often occurs for years until the perpetrator is caught (Herbig and 
Wiskoff 2002). Other technical indicators to theft of IP included use of personal and work email as well as 
remote network access (Hanley et al. 2011), whereas espionage cases have more frequently used other 
mechanisms for transferring compromised data, including document printing and removable devices 
(Band,  et al. 2006).   
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Researchers studying insider fraud cases have established a fraud cycle timeline, depicted in Figure 1.  
Common fraud indicators include: employees not taking vacations, employee disgruntlement over lack of 
promotions or raises, illegal transfer of funds found by auditing, and employees using corporate credit 
cards for personal use, also found by auditing and monitoring (Cummings et al. 2012).  In contrast, 
espionage cases have frequently included unexplained absences, employees subject to minimal technical 
access controls and monitoring, and employees having complete access to entire data stores (Band, et al. 
2006).  Given the overarching degree of trust often awarded to employees with access to highly classified 
information, and the absence of auditing and monitoring, the category of espionage is quite different from 
fraud.  In fraud cases, there is often a higher degree of technical skill required to exploit the system, and 
fraud is often detected sooner than espionage (Band, et al. 2006). 
 
Figure 1.  Timeline for fraud (Cummings et al. 2012) 
Sabotage is hallmarked by the creation of back door accounts and singular release of a logic bomb (Band, 
et al. 2006).  Contrasted with espionage, where multiple accesses to a system are necessary to gather 
information,  most acts of sabotage only occur once (Band, et al. 2006).   Overall, many of the technical 
indicators enumerated by insider research for IP theft, fraud, and sabotage do not appear in the research 
for espionage and vice versa (Band et al. 2006; Cummings et al. 2012; Hanley et al. 2011).   
The literature has been particularly devoid of technical indicators of espionage activity.  We contend this 
is because the ever-changing technological implementation has been the focus, instead of higher-level, 
abstracted ritual of espionage that stays more constant over time.  When cases are examined from a 
higher-level process and behavioral event perspective, considering espionage objectives rather than 
technological implementation, an abstracted ritual of espionage emerges that can be instantiated in 
various technologies, organizations, and methodological approaches over time.  Technical indicators can 
then be identified more easily and accurately for specific organizations, at specific points in time, with 
specific technology availability, than is otherwise possible without the ritualistic view of insider espionage.  
We propose the idea of an espionage ritual that is agile and adaptive to changing technology, and 
therefore differentiating it from a detection signature. 
The purpose of this study (a research-in-progress) is to conduct a cursory analysis of a small subset of 
espionage cases to hypothesize an espionage ritual and lay the groundwork for a more extensive empirical 
study that validates or adapts the espionage ritual to better detect future espionage attacks.  The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  First, we present important definitions and a discussion of 
literature relevant to the research question.  Next, we discuss examples of currently known technical 
indicators of espionage and highlight gaps in the research.  Then, we propose a theoretical espionage 
ritual with a model and two levels of abstraction. Finally, we conclude with future research and 
conclusions.   
Background 
In this section, we provide background discussion and define important concepts, including: espionage, 
the insider, the insider threat, procedural ritual, and technical indicators.  Band et al. (2006) view 
espionage and sabotage in the same milieu, and thus characterize espionage as malicious activity in which 
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the insider’s primary goal is to harm the organization or an individual.  Espionage is more traditionally 
referred to as a compromise of organizational classified or proprietary information to foreign entities 
(Kramer et al. 2005).  Section 793 of United States Code Title 18 defines espionage as a multi-step 
process, which includes procuring National Defense Information (which may or may not be classified), 
stealing it alone or via an accomplice with access, making contact with a recipient of the information, and 
transferring the information to the recipient (Herbig and Wiskoff 2002).  For this study, the definition of 
espionage is a confluence of these definitions, expands motivation beyond aid to foreign entities and 
includes anti-government acts of civil disobedience, and is the compromise or attempt to compromise 
organizational classified or proprietary information to external entities (Herbig and Wiskoff 2002; 
Kramer et al. 2005). 
Insiders are personnel, such as permanent or temporary employees, vendors, contractors, suppliers, ex-
employees, who are most capable of exploiting organizational assets (Kramer et al. 2005).  Insiders 
operate within defined boundaries and have been granted some degree of trust and privilege within those 
boundaries (Chivers et al. 2013).  Not only do insiders have privilege, but they have access and intimate 
knowledge of organizational processes that give them the ability to exploit vulnerabilities (Willison and 
Warkentin 2013).  An insider threat occurs when an insider uses legitimate access to act in a way 
inconsistent with organizational security policy (Bishop and Gates 2008).   It is further defined by an 
“insider’s action that puts at risk an organization’s data, processes, or resources in a disruptive or 
unwelcome way” (Pfleeger et al. 2010, p. 170).  Insider threats can even put business viability at risk 
(Pfleeger and Stolfo 2009). 
Previous research has investigated the psychological and organizational aspects of insider espionage, 
noting that this type of attack is often subtle, slow, and preceded by behavioral indicators such as 
organizational rule-breaking, organizational conflict, and behavioral deviance (Chivers et al. 2013).  
Psychological and organizational behaviors observed before and during insider sabotage and espionage 
include serious mental health disorders, personality problems, poor social skills and decision-making 
biases, and a history of rule conflicts (Band, et al. 2006).  More specifically discriminating psychological 
and organizational indicators included disgruntlement, tardiness, truancy, arguments with coworkers, 
poor job performance, security violations, attack preparations, and addictions.  While important, these 
behaviors do not clearly distinguish espionage from sabotage or the other types of insider threat (Band, et 
al. 2006; Herbig and Wiskoff 2002; Moore et al. 2013; Shaw et al. 1999).  A comprehensive behavioral-
technical profile is necessary for each type.  Accordingly, this paper focuses on the technical aspect of the 
insider engaging in espionage. 
The Capability, Motive, and Opportunity (CMO) model postulates that a perpetrator must have the 
capability, motive, and opportunity for a successful insider attack (Schultz 2002).  The capability for 
espionage includes the means to collect and transfer sensitive information to foreign entities (Kramer et 
al. 2005).  The motive for espionage occurs as a result of a complex interaction between personality 
characteristics and situational dynamics (Kramer et al. 2005).  It is most often money or disgruntlement, 
but over time money usually becomes the dominant motive (Herbig and Wiskoff 2002).  The opportunity 
for espionage consists of access to classified or proprietary information that can be exchanged for money 
or other benefits, and access to foreign entities interested in obtaining this information (Kramer et al. 
2005).  The CMO model also interleaves various situational dynamics, each partially facilitating the 
successful commission of espionage activity.  Such situational dynamics include insider personal 
predispositions to committing malicious acts, stressful events contributing to the likelihood of occurrence, 
concerning behaviors observed before the occurrence of espionage, technical actions occurring before the 
espionage, organizations ignoring or failing to detect rule violations, and/or lack of physical and electronic 
access controls in an organization (Band, et al. 2006).   
The procedural ritual refers to a recognizable and repeatable pattern of activity, or “special routines” as 
referred to by Carnes (2001).  In the context of the insider committing espionage, ritualistic activities are 
those observable, repeating process-level steps that precede and/or facilitate espionage activity.  They are 
abstracted and independent of technological advancements and implementations.  For example, whereas 
exfiltration of sensitive data in the 1970’s involved copy machines and paper documents, exfiltration in 
the 21st century often involves copying digital data onto removable media.  
Last, technical indicators are the non-abstracted, technological implementations of the espionage ritual.  
For example, copying large amounts of data incident to use of removable thumb drives is a technical 
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indicator, whereas ‘data exfiltration’ is the abstracted, process-level, ritualistic artifact.  This paper 
explores the idea that when abstracted to the process level, insider technical actions actually follow a 
pattern or sequence that can be determined by analyzing previous cases of insider espionage, which is 
supported by other modeling and simulation studies (Chivers et al. 2013). 
Technical Indicator Analysis 
In this section, we review relevant literature and six documented espionage cases perpetrated by trusted 
insiders.  We illuminate technical indicators with the end goal of postulating an espionage ritual, useful 
for future empirical analysis. 
CERT has been actively conducting case-level analyses of documented insider threat cases in all four 
categories.  One such study published by Band et al. (2006) comparatively evaluates insider sabotage 
cases and insider espionage cases, in part to illuminate technical indicators of insider activity.  As Figure 2 
shows, their case review shows that observable technical indicators precede harmful actions on the part of 
the insider.  Figure 2 shows what occurs when organizations fail to recognize and act upon the technical 
indicators preceding espionage, with the harmful actions representing the act of insider espionage in 
progress.  The arrows and “S” and “O” notations in the model represent direction of influence (i.e., “S” 
represents variables move in same direction, “O” indicates a movement in opposite direction) (Band, et al. 
2006).  The trust trap (with CERT feedback loop reference label R2, R representative of a “reinforcing” 
vice “balancing” loop in their modeling system) is a reinforcing loop depicting the trust displayed by an 
organization to an individual over time, which research has shown to increase over time (Band, et al. 
2006).  Due to the increase of trust over time, organizations tend to discover fewer technical indicators 
and harmful actions (Band, et al. 2006).   
 
Figure 2. Insider Technological Observables Model (Band, et al. 2006). 
Band et al. (2006) used system dynamics modeling to analyze nine espionage cases from the Defense 
Personnel Security Research Center’s “Espionage Database”—a database storing information about 150 
espionage cases dating back to 1940.  Their review of the nine cases illuminated the fifteen (15) “technical 
observables” shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Insider Espionage Technical Observables, Adapted from (Band, et al. 2006). 
Our review of six espionage cases perpetrated by insiders disclosed several significant commonalities and 
differences between the cases.  As expected, the commonalities emerge when the technical actions are 
abstracted to a higher, process level, related to technical objectives, rather than low-level technological 
implementations.  Similarly, the differences are evidence when the cases are analyzed at the technical 
implementation level, wherein actions are affected by various organizational conditions and technological 
advancements impacted greatly by date of occurrence.  Table 3 summarizes the technical actions and 
chronological context of the six cases reviewed.   
Common to all six cases is the technological objective: accessing information outside of need to know 
(Band, et al. 2006).  Master Sergeant (MSgt) Brian Patrick Reagan, a former U.S. Air Force intelligence 
analyst, accessed missile site information from a classified database that was authorized but outside of his 
need to know (Band, et al. 2006).  Both Robert Hanssen, a former FBI agent, and Leandro Aragoncillo, a 
former military security official for the U.S. Vice President, accessed information outside of their need to 
know on the FBI’s Automated Case Support database (Band, et al. 2006).  Another commonality at the 
process-level is the technological objective: unauthorized information transfer. However, when analyzed 
at the technological implementation level, differences emerge.  MSgt Reagan transferred the data in 
printed form, whereas Special Agent Hanssen used floppy-diskettes and Mr. Aragoncillo transmitted the 
data via email.  In other words, the transport mechanism varied, but the objective (unauthorized 
transport) remained constant. 
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Table 3.  Technical Actions of Six Insider Espionage Cases, Adapted from (Band, et al. 
2006; Gallu 2014; Herbig and Wiskoff 2002; Kramer et al. 2005) 
 
Proposed Espionage Ritual 
Based on the technical actions identified in the previous section and summarized in Tables 2 and 3, we 
propose the basic espionage ritual shown in Figure 3.  Table 4 shows how the behavioral ritual can be used 
as a framework from which to derive technical indicators.   
 
Figure 3.  Proposed Espionage Ritual 
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RITUALISTIC 
BEHAVIOR 
(Technological 
Objective) 
Info 
exploration and 
browsing  
Data 
acquisition  
Data 
preparation 
Unauthorized 
info transfer 
Technical 
Indicator 
(Technological 
Implementation) 
 Hacking 
 Web browsing 
 Web crawling 
 Network share 
browsing 
 Database 
querying 
 Download and 
installation of 
malware and 
tools 
 Copying data 
 Web scraping 
 Document 
printing 
 Encryption 
 Compression 
 Stegonographic 
embedding 
 Cutting/pasting 
 Data 
organization 
 Archiving 
 Moving to 
alternate media 
 Relabeling files, 
data, disks 
 Hand-carrying 
printed data 
off-site 
 Hand-carrying 
digital data off-
site on digital 
media (e.g. 
laptops, thumb 
drives, 
CD/DVDs, hard 
drives) 
 Mailing printed 
data 
 Emailing digital 
data 
 Uploading to 
website, email 
‘drafts’ folder, 
or other remote 
storage location 
Table 4. Technical Indicators of Ritualistic Behavior 
This espionage behavioral ritual allows for variation and iteration.  In some cases, information 
exploration may not occur and the insider may simply acquire, prepare, and transfer the data.  They may 
not seek out additional information in an exploratory manner, although most cases reviewed seemed to 
include this step.  The steps may occur over varied time periods and may or may not repeat.  The 
technological implementations may vary over time in insider threat cases where data exfiltration occurs 
over the course of many years, such as former FBI Agent Robert Hanssen, who was charged with spying 
for Russia for more than 15 years (Band, et al. 2006).  In order for time periods can be calculated during 
an empirical study, T1-T4 are included on the model in figure 3.  Further, Mr. Hanssen initially acquired 
only data he had technical access to, but later used a password cracker to gain unauthorized access to his 
supervisor’s data.  The frequency and timing of activity may vary widely from case to case, which is again 
why specific technical signatures are problematic and the more abstracted view of technical behavior at 
the ritualistic, technical objective level may be more successful.   
Future Research and Concluding Comments 
While the proposed espionage ritual was derived from past literature and the analysis of a small number 
of espionage cases, further empirical research is needed.  More cases need to be analyzed to: (1) test the 
robustness of the proposed ritual, (2) refine the list of technical indicators for each step in the espionage 
ritual cycle, and (3) test the utility of the cycle in deriving technical indicators.  We propose that past cases 
can be analyzed to identify technical actions and indicators from previous attacks of espionage and map 
those to the higher-level, abstracted espionage ritual.  We further propose that a post-hoc, multi-case 
study analysis using formal modeling methodology could determine the retrospective detection 
probability had the espionage ritual been considered when developing and deploying insider espionage 
detection mechanisms.  Last, we propose that the robust, refined espionage ritual can be used to predict 
future attacks. 
Clearly, a limitation of this study is its restricted case study analysis.  Empirical testing will be challenging 
due to: (1) accessibility of case data and (2) the volume of data for documented cases, should access be 
granted for the purpose of mining technical indicators.  Further, the data collection procedure will require 
laborious content analysis techniques.   
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This paper presents the idea of a higher abstraction of technical espionage indicators in the form of an 
espionage ritual cycle.  We propose that this ritual can be determined by examining previous insider 
espionage attacks coupled with current research on technical indicator trends for espionage.   
Accordingly, past literature and high-level analysis of six insider threat cases support the proposed 
espionage ritual cycle.           
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